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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO CONTINUE TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT. 
A. APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD THE 
CLAIM OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
In Brief of Appellee, the Appellee argues that the court did not err in denying the 
Appellant's motion to amend his Complaint to include a claim under a boundary by 
acquiescence doctrine since the plain language of the Complaint did not set forth such a 
claim and the trial court correctly determined that the land belonged to Appellee. Brief of 
Appellee at p. 8. Appellee fails to sufficiently support their arguments under the 
particulars of the "boundary by acquiescence" doctrine and mistakenly believes the trial 
court's ultimate determination supports its prior decision not to allow Appellant to amend 
his Complaint. The trial court's ultimate determination, however, was made without the 
claim of "boundary by acquiescence" being considered and, thus, cannot be determinative 
of it. 
"For purposes of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, to "acquiesce" means 
to recognize and treat an observable line, such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the 
owner's property from the adjacent landowner's property." RHN Corp. v. VeibelL 2004 
UT 60, f24, 96 P.3d 935. "Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party 
attempting to establish a particular line as the boundary between properties must establish 
that the parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the properties." Id, citing 
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, [^18, 44 P.3d 781. "Acquiescence is a 'highly fact-
dependent question' [citation omitted], and 'acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit 
and inferred from evidence, i.e., the landowner's actions with respect to a particular line 
may evidence the landowner impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the 
demarcation between the properties." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined as follows: 
A plaintiff is required, under our liberal standard of notice pleading, to 
"submit a short and plain statement... showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief and a "demand for judgment for the relief." UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1)-
(2). The plaintiff must only give the defendant "fair notice of the nature and 
basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved." 
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Canfield v. Lavton Citv, 2005 UT 60,1114, 122 P.3d 622, citing Williams v. State Farm 
Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966,971 (Utah 1982). Further, "[t]he rule is designed to provide notice 
of the nature of the claims asserted against a defendant and an opportunity to meet those 
claims." See Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982), Cowlev v. 
Porter. 2005 UT 518, U36, 127 P.3d 1224. 
The Utah Court of Appeals discussed the purpose of the liberalized pleading rules 
when it stated, "the fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford 
parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining 
to their dispute,' subject only to the requirement that their adversary have 'fair notice of 
the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved.'" Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Medical Center. Inc. 2005 UT App 
325, U2, 122 P.3d 891, citing Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 
1982), (citations omitted). As a result, "these principles are applied with great liberality in 
sustaining the sufficiency of allegations stating a cause of action or an affirmative 
defense." Id 
In the matter of Blackham v. Snelgrove. 280 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1955), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed the function of pleadings, stating as follows: 
Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, 
issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily and 
inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the facts before 
trial was narrowly confined and was often cumbersome in method. The new 
rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving 
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and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the 
preparation for trial. 
. . .Thus, it can very often be found stated in these cases that a complaint is 
required only to '* * *give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and 
basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved.' It may also frequently be found stated in these cases 
that a complaint does not fail to state a claim unless '* * *it appears to a 
certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of 
facts which could be proved in support of the claim.' 
At trial and in Appellant's opening brief, Appellant argued that paragraphs five (5) 
and six (6) of his Complaint gave adequate fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds 
of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved to Appellee that the 
fence that had been in existence for a substantially long period of time was the agreed 
upon boundary between the properties, and that Appellee was encroaching on the 
Appellant's property. Counsel for the Appellee stated at the hearing that he had no notice 
of the theory. However, in the discovery served upon the Appellee on January 14, 2004, 
and Appellant's Initial Disclosures, which were served upon the Appellee on May 4, 
2004, responses and witnesses were listed indicating Appellant's position with respect to 
this issue, and showing supporting evidence of the nature of the claim. Appellant 
concedes that he did not use the language "boundary of acquiescence" in his pleading, but 
the language used in the pleadings and discovery process clearly provided the fair notice 
of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of 
4 
litigation. See, Zoumadakis at 1J2. Notification and evidence respecting all particularities 
of a claim under boundary by acquiescence were provided. See, RHNCorp. supra. 
As stated above, the rules that govern the filing of pleadings are liberally construed 
to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have 
pertaining to their dispute." See.Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., supra. Appellant was 
denied the privilege of presenting his legitimate contentions to the trial court pertaining 
to his dispute with the defendant in this matter. The trial court effectively revoked this 
privilege by denying Appellant his request to amend his Complaint to include the words 
"boundary by acquiescence" as a defined term for his already-stated claim. By so 
denying Appellant's request, it was clear that the trial court did not intend to render a 
determination based upon this doctrine, somehow believing that the already-stated claim 
was plead under a different claim. 
The trial court erred in concluding that Appellant's claims were not plead under 
the "boundary by acquiescence" doctrine. Further, having done so, the trial court denied 
Appellant the right to amend the pleading with a defined term that was typically utilized 
in conjunction with the claims already set forth. Appellant's pleadings gave the Appellee 
fair notice of the grounds against him and notified him of the type of litigation that was 
involved. Even though his pleadings did not use the exact language "boundary of 
acquiescence," he met the requirements needed to inform the Appellee of his claims, 
grounds and the litigation against him. Appellee would not have suffered any prejudice 
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by the amendment since defendant's attorney was well notified and had prepared a 
defense accordingly to the witnesses and evidence presented by Appellant. 
B. Appellant was Prejudiced by not being Allowed to Amend his Pleadings 
"Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to amend pleadings 'shall be 
freely given' by the court 'when justice so requires.'" Savage v. Utah Youth Village. 
2004 UT 102 K9, 104 P.3d 1242, citing Johnson v. Brinkerhoff 89 Utah 530, 57 P.2d 
1132, 1136 (1936). "The court's ultimate goal is to have the 'real controversy between the 
parties presented, their rights determined, and the cause decided.'" Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed what provides ample support to deny a 
motion to amend, and has determined that simple prejudice is not enough. In Kasco 
Services Corp. v. Bensoa the Utah Supreme Court indicated that a motion to amend 
should be denied only where 'the opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by 
having an issue adjudicated for which he had not time to prepare." 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 
1992) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The court's insistence 
that the nonmoving party suffer "unavoidable prejudice" to justify a denial of a motion to 
amend is well-established in Utah law. See, e.g., Fishbaugh v. Utah Power and Light a 
Div. ofPacificorp. 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998), Timm v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381, 1389 
(Utah 1996). This is based on the principle that the parties should not be forced to litigate 
issues for which they had little time to respond. See, Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 
1183 (Utah 1993)(noting that "[a] prime consideration in determining whether an 
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amendment should be permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for the opposing party 
to meet the newly raised matter" {quoting Lewis v. Moultree.627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 
1981))); Chenev v. Rucker. 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) (noting that 
"[w]hat [parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet 
them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required."). Thus, in order to justify 
the denial of a motion to amend on grounds of prejudice, the prejudice "must be undue or 
substantial prejudice, since almost every amendment of a pleading will result in some 
'practical prejudice' to the opposing party. Mere inconvenience to the opposing party is 
not grounds to deny a motion to amend." 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 776 (2003) 
(emphasis added). "[T]he fact that an amended pleading may require the defendant to 
conduct additional discovery does not, alone, constitute sufficient grounds to justify the 
denial of a motion to amend. In determining whether the amendment will cause prejudice, 
the court's inquiry should center on whether the nonmoving party has a fair opportunity to 
litigate the new issue." Id at § 777. 
As stated supra, Appellee would not have suffered any unavoidable prejudice by 
the amendment since defendant's attorney was well notified and had prepared a defense 
accordingly to the witnesses and evidence presented by Appellant. Appellee in this 
matter had sufficient notice that Appellant was making a "boundary of acquiescence" 
claim since he had plead the elements and provided evidential support for it throughout 
the discovery and disclosures. All necessary documents had been provided to the 
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Appellee long before trial. Appellee had plenty of time to prepare to meet the boundary 
by acquiescence claim at trial. Allowing Appellant to amend his pleadings to include the 
specific wording "boundary of acquiescence" would not have resulted in any prejudice to 
Appellee, since Appellee already had plenty notice of this claim. 
The trial court prejudiced Appellant by not allowing him to amend his pleadings to 
include the boundary by acquiescence claim. The claim was plead in the original 
pleadings in theory, it was just not specifically defined under this terminology. Pleadings 
are governed by liberalized rules and Appellant should have been allowed to amend his 
pleadings to include the correct terminology. By denying the Appellant the opportunity 
to amend his pleadings, Appellant was prejudiced in that the trial court may have 
misconstrued his claim as something other than "boundary by acquiescence." Had 
Appellant been able to amend his pleadings, it is likely the trial court would have granted 
him relief under the doctrine and he would have been granted access to use land that is 
rightfully his and has been for many years. 
II. APPELLANT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
A BOUNDARY OF ACQUIESCENCE. 
"The elements of boundary by acquiescence are 1) occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, 2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, 3) for a period of time, 4) by adjoining landowners." Jacobs v. Hafen. 917 
P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). In Englert v. Zane. 848 P.2d 165, 169, (Utah App. 1993), 
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The Utah Supreme Court defined a boundary line by acquiescence as "...open to 
observation." Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah 1966). A boundary line "must 
be definite, certain and not speculative." Id. 
In Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794, (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed the reason for the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence when it 
stated as follows: 
"[t]he very reason for being of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or 
agreement is that in the interest of preserving the peace and good order of 
society the quietly resting bones of the past, which no one seems to have 
been troubled or complained about for a long period of years, should not be 
unearthed for the purpose of stirring up controversy, but should be left in 
their repose. Arising out of this reason for being, an indispensable 
requirement for application of the doctrine is the existence of the boundary 
for a long period of time, which the actual decisions in all of our cases on 
the subject affirm." 
In the instant matter the Appellant has provided sufficient evidence to prove that 
the boundary line of the property was established by acquiescence. Many people testified 
as to the existence of the fence and the length of time it had been in existence. Ms. Sarah 
Simmons testified that she was 82 years old and that the fence line was had been the 
boundary line between the properties before she was a child. Tr. at. pp. 22-29. Farrell 
Bobby Simmons, the son of Sarah Simmons, testified that the fence line had been the 
boundary. Tr. at pp. 31-34. Appellant testified that there was a marker with the fence 
line and that he had been told by his father as a child that it was the boundary of the 
property. Tr. at. P. 55. 
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Appellant presented sufficient evidence and testimony to establish the property 
line by "boundary by acquiescence." Appellant also established the necessary elements 
needed for a "boundary by acquiescence." First, the property line was visually marked. 
A fence ran right down the line for many years. There is no dispute that a fence existed in 
the middle of the two properties and it was visible to everyone. Several different people 
gave testimony at trial that it was their knowledge that the fence was the boundary of the 
property and that they were not aware of any other boundary line. 
Second, there had been mutual acquiescence to the fence being the property 
boundary line years before Appellee owned the property. In the case of Johnson v. 
Sessions. 25 Utah 2d 133,477 P.2d 788, (Utah 1970) "the trial court found a boundary by 
acquiescence in that a fence was erected by the then owners of the lots some 21 years 
prior to the commencement of this litigation." The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's decision. Based upon this holding, Appellee's acquired ownership of the property 
does not extinguish the fence as the property line. The fence as the property boundary 
line had been established for years before the Appellee even received the property. There 
had been mutual acquiescence to the fence being the property boundary line for years 
before this litigation. Appellant testified that he had owned one piece of property 
adjoining the Appellee's land for fifteen (15) years and another piece for six (6) years 
after purchasing it back from his brother. Tr. at p. 54. Mrs. Simmons testified that 
Appellee had owned his property for approximately 14 years. Tr. at p. 31. As the fence 
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had been in place foi som z time prior to either "the Appellant's or Appellee's ownership of 
the adjacent lands, the property line had been established by mutual acquiescence prior to 
the ownership of either party in this matter. 
testified to bi I"1 ft: s Simmons, the fence had been in place since 
before her birth and at the time of trial she was 82 years old. This establishes that the 
fence had been the boundary line for quite some time and through several different 
landowner is apparent that the (vm \ li hi h . n .ii.fiiii.l bi .1 SHI,,,I„„I.IIII,I„I II IL^ IIL III "limn 
and had been considered the boundary of the property for many years. This establishment 
m e e t s ^ jjjjj^j e i e m e n t 
Finally, the adjoining owners of the property never disputed what the property line 
was. The landowners had established the fence as the boundary line, which was not 
because * i\\ pellet: acquncil lilllln propen i establish feet at "the 
time the Appellee acquired the property. Mrs. Simmons testified that her son had sold 
the property to Appellee and that it was her understanding that the fence was the 
boundary line "herefon i1 i| |i*. ' - PIn 111:1 'ulh |imparly 
adjoining Appellee's had any kind of discrepancy with the boundary line of the property 
being the fence line. Therefore, Appellant established the fourth element. 
If the trial court had allowed an amendment to conform to the evidence in this 
matter, it is clear that Appellant would have succeeded in his claim of "boundary by 
acquiescence." Even in light of the denial of the motion to amend, Appellant solicited 
sufficient evidence at trial to allow this Court to make the determination as to the facts of 
this matter. Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his 
motion to amend the Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's order and remand with direction to the trial court to allow 
Appellant to amend his Complaint so as to have a proper trial on the claims contained 
therein. 
DATED this day of April, 2006. 
Cindy Barton-Coombs 
Attorney for Hal McKee 
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